Lockally

      Use your API key in the examples

      Replaces lk_live_… in the code samples on this site so you can copy and run them. It is stored in this browser only and is never sent anywhere, including to Ask AI.

      It will be visible on the page. Use a test key if you are sharing your screen or taking screenshots.

      TLS requirements

      What the API accepts

      Protocols TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 only
      TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, SSLv3 refused
      Ciphers ECDHE with AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305, forward secrecy throughout
      HSTS max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
      Session tickets off

      Verified against the running service rather than taken from a template. Every HTTPS host we serve carries the same policy: api., app., mail., platform., autoconfig. and mcp.

      There is no plaintext HTTP endpoint for the API. Port 80 answers only the ACME challenge and a 404.

      What this means for your client

      Almost nothing, if your language runtime is current. Every maintained TLS stack has defaulted to 1.2 or better for years.

      It matters in two cases:

      A very old runtime. Anything that cannot negotiate TLS 1.2 cannot reach the API at all, and the failure is a handshake error rather than an HTTP status, so it will not look like an API problem. If you see a connection refused or a protocol error and nothing in your logs mentions Lockally, check the TLS version your client offers first.

      A proxy in the way. A corporate middlebox that terminates and re-originates TLS may offer something older than your application does. The handshake you need to check is the proxy’s, not yours.

      Mail protocols

      Different ports, same principle, and no unencrypted option at all:

      IMAP 993, implicit TLS
      POP3 995, implicit TLS
      SMTP submission 465 implicit TLS, or 587 with STARTTLS

      Ports 143 and 110 are not served. A client offering “no encryption” will not connect.

      Outbound mail to other providers uses opportunistic TLS, which is the internet standard for SMTP between servers: we encrypt wherever the receiving server supports it, and a server that offers none still receives the mail. That is not a decision we can make unilaterally without silently failing to deliver.